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fter the successful adoption of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), the integration of 
retail financial markets is a next frontier for the EU. Several measures covering areas such 
as payments, retail credit and investment funds, and stretching across different policy areas 
are under discussion or are in the course of being implemented. In addition, the European 
Commission has started to look more closely at the sector from a competition policy standpoint. 
But will the EU manage to create an integrated retail financial market? The single market has been 
on the agenda since 1992, and progress on the retail side has been extremely limited judging by 
certain indicators. It could even be argued that it has receded, as the EU’s single market agenda 
has contributed to national consolidation of operators, which has reduced competition in many 
smaller and medium-sized member states. 
This paper starts with a bird’s eye view of retail financial markets in the EU today and their degree 
of integration. It reviews the EU measures affecting retail financial markets and how rule-making 
has evolved over the last 15 years. In a third section, we discuss issues raised by EU rule-making in 
retail financial markets and conclude with some recommendations for policy. 
Retail financial markets are defined as services to consumers and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). In banking, the most important sub-sector of financial markets, retail represents over 50% 
of total EU activity in terms of gross income. According to European Commission estimates, retail 
banking represents a gross income of €250-275 billion per annum, which is equivalent to 
























EU RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS TODAY 
From a retail perspective, there is no such thing as an integrated financial market in the EU today. Market 
structures differ strongly; savings, credit and investment attitudes follow different patterns; consumer and 
investor protection measures vary; and language and habits diverge. Seen from a policy-maker’s point of 
view, the non-existence of an integrated retail financial market is one of the biggest disappointments of 
European integration. 
It suffices to mention a few figures to demonstrate that retail banking is national at best, even within the 
euro area: the share of loans granted in the euro area by cross-border monetary financial institutions 
(MFIs) to non-MFIs stood at 2.2% at the end of 1997 (1.5% for the rest of the EU); this figure had risen 
to no more than 4.2% in June 2007 (2.9% for the rest of the EU). Taking a price-based indicator, the 
cross-country standard deviation of interest rates on consumer credit had been rather high and constant, 
on average 1% over the period June 2003 – June 2007, with a slight increase over the last two years. And, 
to give another indicator for the level of retail banking integration, the cross-country dispersion of interest 
rates on lending for house purchases amounted to, on average, 0.3% over the same period, with no clear 
declining trend visible so far.
1 Meanwhile in wholesale banking, similar indicators such as data on cross-
border interbank lending and securities issuance showed substantial progress over the same period (see 
Figure 1). 








































































































































































































Cross-Border Interbank Loans Cross-Border Loans to Non-Banks
Cross-Border Non-Bank Securities Other Than Shares Cross-Border Non-Bank Shares and Other Equity
 
Note: Cross-border activity is expressed as a percentage of the total euro area provision of financial services. 
Source: ECB (2007). 
Comparing different segments of retail financial markets indicates how much lending habits differ in the 
EU. The total indebtedness of households in the EU differs from well over 100% of GDP in Denmark to 
about 20% of GDP in most of the new member states, with an EU average of 59% in the EU-15, and 56% 
                                                 
1 Data taken from the European Central Bank’s indicators of financial integration in the euro area, and based on a speech by 
Jean-Claude Trichet on “The state of European financial integration” at the Third Euro Fixed Income Forum, Euromoney 
Conferences, Paris, 28 November 2005. As regards mortgage lending, it could be argued that risks are region-specific, and that 














for the EU-27 in 2006 (see Figure 2). Comparing the composition of household debt shows that, while 
mortgage credit is by far the most important component, the share of short-term consumer credit differs 
importantly, varying from 16.5% in the UK to 3.4% in Italy (see Figure 2). Interesting to note is that it is 
difficult to generalise about differences in patterns of consumer lending in Anglo-Saxon vs. continental 
European countries, with Germany having a share of 10% of GDP, Spain 9.5% and Greece 13% (see 
Figure 3). Growth of consumer credit has also been more pronounced in the Southern European countries 
over the last few years, with growth rates in most standing at well above 10%.
2 
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Moving to another segment of retail financial markets, investment funds, one finds large differences in 
long-term savings behaviour of households. Assuming that investment funds are essentially used by non-
professional investors, these differences reflect different attitudes towards savings and investment. 
Although the share of equity funds has increased from 26% in 1996 to 43% in 2006 at EU level, bond and 
money market funds have remained important (see Figure 4). In certain member states, such as France, 
Greece and Portugal, short-term money market funds continue to account for 30% of the investment fund 
markets, while in other member states, such as Denmark, the UK and Belgium/Netherlands, they are 
almost non-existent. Bond funds also continue to be the most popular investment funds in several member 
states, such as Austria, Denmark and Spain, with shares close to half of the local investment fund market. 
Equity funds are the most popular investment funds in the UK, with 68% of the fund market, but also in 
Sweden, with 70%, and the Netherlands, with 55%. 
























































Equity Funds Bond Funds Hybrid Funds Money Market Funds
118 121 5 282 73 24 283 6,309 58 1,473 9 315 1,839 86 32 26 3 147 14 729
 
Source: European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA). 
 
A side-effect of the diversity in fund markets is the lack of scale economies; less competition (as fund 
managers have to adapt supply of products to local demand), and limited synergies and cost savings on 
the operational side. The fund market is probably the clearest example of the non-integration of retail 
financial markets in the EU, the cost of which is passed on to the user. The number of European funds is 
four times higher than in the US, but the average size is less than one-fifth that of US-based funds (see 
Figure 5). The sub-optimal average size brings about higher operational costs for fund managers, a higher 




























A third segment of retail financial markets, payments, also shows large structural differences. Even today, 
payment habits differ widely throughout the EU. There are large variations in the use of means of 
payment: cash, pre-paid cards, debit cards, credit cards, cheque-based payments and electronic transfers. 
In some member states, cheques have entirely disappeared in the retail sector, whereas in others, their use 
is still widespread (see Figure 6). An indication of the differences in availability of means of payment is 
the density of ATMs in the EU, which varies from 1 per 663 inhabitants in Portugal or 1 per 762 in Spain 
to 1 per 3,235 in Sweden and 1 per 3,837 inhabitants in Poland, for an EU-25 average of 1 per 1,355 
inhabitants (ECB, 2007, p. 17). This is not only a matter of new versus old member states, as the 
eurozone average is 1,249, or only slightly below the EU-25 average. 
Figure 6. Number of cashless payments per capita in the EU-25 
 























EU MEASURES AFFECTING RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The above overview suggests that a single EU retail financial market hardly exists, and gives the 
impression that the EU has not done much in this area so far. This is not the case, however; the EU has 
been active as well in the harmonisation of conditions for financial products and services providers. But 
unlike wholesale financial markets, the main factor determining strength in retail financial markets is 
distribution networks, and its is only very recently that the EU has started to act from this perspective on 
the basis of its powers to ensure free competition in the single market. A number of indicators such as 
market fragmentation, price rigidity and customer immobility suggest that competition in the EU retail 
banking market may not be working effectively, preventing users from getting the full benefits of the 
single market. 
EU action in the domain of retail financial market harmonisation has mainly focused on products as well 
as on the conditions for the services providers. This distinction is still relevant, as the question remains 
how to best integrate markets, through product or further services providers’ harmonisation. The debate 
regarding an optional 28
th regime (see below), which has been ongoing for some time, is an example of 
the former, whereas the recent MiFID directive is an example of the latter. 
The first product harmonising directives date back to the mid-1980s, and some can be considered to be 
truly successful. The UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) 
Directive introduced a single format for the open-ended funds that invest in transferable debt or equity 
securities to be sold with a single authorisation throughout the EU. Today, there are around 32,000 
UCITS products, representing over €6 trillion of assets under management. UCITS licensed products 
thereby represent about 79% of the total assets of European investment funds.
3 These facts point to the 
success of the UCITS brand as one that is operational and reliable, all the while securing a high degree of 
investor protection.  
Another example of a product-harmonising measure is the consumer credit Directive (CCD) (87/102 
EEC) of 1987, which essentially harmonised the calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge 
(APR) for short-term consumer loans in the EU, and required all banks to apply it. Although the APR is 
largely followed in the EU – there were some loopholes in the directive such as for mail order companies 
– consumer credit is rarely sold on a cross-border basis, as indicated by the data above.
4  
A third group of product-harmonising measures concern those in the field of retail payments. The best 
known is the 2001 EU regulation on cross-border payments, a directly applicable measure that mandates 
that charges have to be the same whether the payment is national or cross-border. It applies to credit 
transfers, cash withdrawals at cash dispensers and payments by means of debit and credit cards. Although 
the regulation was heavily contested by the banks, it was preceded by years of empty promises by the 
banking industry to bring down costs for cross-border transfers and cash withdrawals abroad. Two further 
important developments in this domain, the first being a new payment services providers’ directive, 
which allows payment transmitters to have a single licence at a regulatory capital cost that is far below 
what is required for traditional banks. Payments and related services are currently treated differently in 
the EU. The second development is SEPA (Single European Payments Area), an initiative by the 
European banking industry, but at the insistence of the European Commission and the ECB, to 
                                                 
3 Data based upon a recent CEPS report on the UCITS review (see Lannoo & Casey, 2008). It should be added that truly cross-
border funds represent only 17% of total UCITS funds, and that the instrument is thus only partially used on a cross-border 
basis. However, this is determined by the control of distribution networks, discussed in more detail below.  
4 The consumer credit Directive was recently amended (April 2008) to increase the level of harmonisation, and has become a 














standardise the processing of retail payments in the EU. The effect for users is that value dates for 
transfers are harmonised and time limits are set for settlement at EU-wide level. 
To the group of services providers’ directives belong the well-known second banking, investment 
services (ISD) and insurance Directives. The basic approach of these directives was minimum 
harmonisation of basic prudential rules and standards and mutual recognition, i.e. subject to compliance 
with EU-wide harmonised rules, financial institutions could provide services throughout the EU. This 
approach has been successful in wholesale finance, but much less so in the retail domain. The directives 
allowed member states to impose additional barriers based upon the ‘general good’ clause, which was 
invoked to maintain host country consumer protection rules, as these were not, or insufficiently, 
harmonised by the directives. 
Table 1. EU retail financial product and services harmonising measures 




Cash withdrawals and credit 
transfers 
2003 
E-money institutions directive  E-money issuance and 
administration 
2002 
Payment services providers 
directive 
Money transfer institutions  2009 
Payments 
Single European Payments 
Area (SEPA) 
 2009 
Consumer credit directive  Short term low value retail credit  1990 – 1992 –2000 – 2010  Retail credit 
Mortgage credit white paper     
Investment funds  UCITS I – II – III – (IV)   Single format for equity, bond, 
money market and funds of funds 
1987– 2003 – … 
Free provision of services 
Banking  2
nd banking directive, capital 
requirements directive (CRD) 
Basic banking and investment 
services activities 
1992 – 2007 
Investment services  Investment services directive 
(ISD), Market in financial 
instruments directive (MiFID) 
Investment services (covering also 
structured products, hedge funds, 
etc.) 
1996 – 2007 
Insurance Insurance  directives  Life and non-life insurance 
services 
1990 – 1994 
Deposit (and investor) 
guarantee schemes 
EU-wide minimum level of 
depositor protection 
Minimum level of protection per 
depositor of €20,000, not 
applicable to foreign currencies 
1995 
 
In a second phase of regulation, the consumer or investor protection barriers to the single market gave rise 
to a higher level of harmonisation. In certain cases, the EU went for maximum harmonisation, and in 
others for ‘targeted full harmonisation’. Examples of the former are the 2003 prospectus directive, 
whereas MiFID or the 2005 amendments to the 1987 consumer credit directive exemplify the latter. 
Under the maximum harmonisation approach, the same standards apply throughout the EU, member 
states cannot impose additional standards for firms under their jurisdiction and mutual recognition does 
not apply. Under targeted full harmonisation, full harmonisation applies to a limited set of issues covered 
by certain measures, whereas the rest remains subject to mutual recognition. As a result of differing 














business requirements for investment firms in the EU, making the new directive five times as long as the 
directive it replaced, the ISD. Since the directive has only recently come into force, it is too early to make 
any judgements whether it is working. 
An issue that affects retail financial markets directly but was not given much attention until very recently 
is depositor protection schemes. A 1994 directive harmonised the minimum level of deposit protection in 
the EU at €20,000, but left the method of funding and the degree of co-funding to the member states. In 
addition, there are provisions to make sure that competition between systems, and thus the single market, 
does not emerge (non-export and topping-up provisions with local schemes for branches). In view of the 
failure of Northern Rock, this directive is up for urgent review, as deposit holders of European-wide 
banks would be treated differently in case of a bank failure.  
Given the limited progress in retail financial markets integration, the European Commission started to 
look deeper, and it is only recently that it started to investigate whether competition was functioning 
effectively. In 2005, an inquiry was launched into retail banking, whose conclusions were published in 
January 2007 (European Commission, 2007a). In general, the inquiry found that European retail banking 
markets were not excessively concentrated at national level, but only ‘moderately’. On the basis of a 
special examination of retail banking data only, it found an average concentration ratio of the three and 
five largest retail banks across all EU25 countries (weighted by member state population) of around 50% 
and 60%, respectively (see Figure 7). However, the most concentrated countries, such as Finland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, stand well above this level, and one may wonder whether, with almost 
no cross-border competition, these levels are sound.  
Figure 7. Concentration ratios in banking: CR3 and CR5 (2004) 
 
Note: Intra-sample share (retail income) extrapolated with deposits 
Source: European Commission (2007b). 
 
The inquiry, however, identified behavioural entry barriers and cooperation problems that might lead to 
collusion in the sector. Competition concerns were identified in the following areas: 1) payment systems, 
including card payment systems; 2) credit registers; 3) cooperation between banks; and 4) setting of 














The background study to the sector inquiry provides rich evidence of these problems and is required 
reading for those who want to understand European retail banking better (European Commission, 2007b). 
Some of its findings are really staggering, above all in the field of payment cards, and require a policy 
response. It identified a high variation in cardholder, merchant and inter-bank fees (multilateral 
interchange fees) across the member states, which highlights market fragmentation. In two cases, 
cardholder fees are double that of the EU average, which is €24. Inter-bank fees on credit cards in Visa 
and MasterCard networks in Portugal were more than twice the level of those in Slovakia. Meanwhile 
merchant fees for the same type of cards in Portugal and the Czech Republic were more than three times 
the level of fees in Finland and Italy (see Figure 8). In addition, small business merchant fees are easily 
more than 70% higher than larger ones, which, according to the European Commission, cannot be 
explained by transaction volumes alone. These differences allow the European Commission to exercise its 
powers of enforcement under Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC, to ensure that the competition rules are respected 
in retail banking. In the meantime, the European Commission has started action against MasterCard's 
multilateral interchange fees (MIF) for cross-border payment card transactions under Article 81 of the 
Treaty.
5 





































Note: Weighted Average MSC Rates Charged per Country for MasterCard and Visa Credit Cards, % 
Source: European Commission (2007b). 
 
One of the reasons why integration in retail markets is so limited is that taxation differs widely across the 
EU, a situation that can be expected to remain for some time to come. In the area of direct taxation, very 
few EU harmonising measures have been adopted so far, limited to a few measures eliminating double 
taxation between enterprises and the taxation of savings directive. According to the latter, the exchange of 
information between member states concerning interest income obtained from savings by EU citizens 
becomes automatic. This measure is seen as a way to reduce the reasons why EU citizens place their 
savings in other European jurisdictions, as tax avoidance is tackled, also as far as neighbouring off-shore 
jurisdictions are concerned. The situation is even more dissuasive for equity holders, as foreign dividend 
income is often taxed twice, once in the home country of the company, and once again in the home 
member state of the taxpayer. This situation is a complete anathema to the single market, but has not even 
appeared on the radar screen of European policy-makers. In addition, there are other elements of national 
personal income tax schemes that distort the comparison of European retail financial markets. For 
                                                 














example, the extent to which interest payments on home loans may be deducted from taxable income 
varies from one member state to another. These deductions often do not apply to mortgage loans provided 
by foreign banks under the free provision of services. 
 
ISSUES RAISED BY EU ACTION IN THIS DOMAIN 
The huge diversity in retail financial markets and the resulting EU policy measures discussed above raise 
several important questions, which are outlined below. 
1.  Is targeted full harmonisation, or maximum harmonisation the way forward?  
The increasing reliance on maximum harmonisation to advance market integration is unsound for several 
reasons. First, as the body of EU single market law is based on the principle of minimum harmonisation, 
the practical application of legislation to areas where member states cannot impose additional rules is a 
recipe for problems. It will only work in distinctly defined areas with limited or no overlap with other 
areas of law-making. In the area of consumer credit, for example, a directive harmonising the conditions 
for the cross-border provision of consumer credit using the maximum harmonisation approach directly 
affects EU or national legislation regarding personal data protection or contract law. Second, it excludes 
regulatory competition and market-driven adjustments. In the area of disclosure regulation, for example, 
mandating a maximum level of harmonisation in the prospectus directive seems like a contradiction in 
terms, as an optimal level of disclosure can never be mandated, and room must therefore be built in for 
market-led improvements. More generally, maximum harmonisation also opens the way towards a single 
supervisory authority. If standards are the same all over the EU, it is of less use to continue to apply the 
home-country control principle, which is a cornerstone of the single financial market. Under maximum 
harmonisation, member states only compete in supervisory performance, not on regulatory standards. It 
would thus ease the way towards a single authority.  
2.  Is an optional or 28
th regime feasible? 
Pressure groups have been arguing for some time that a solution to market integration is the adoption of 
an optional 28
th regime, which would be accessible to all market participants, and would allow them to 
choose to follow either their home country regime or the optional 28
th regime. Rather than bothering to 
agree on minimum standards or finding agreement on the elements that would form the basis of targeted 
full harmonisation, a new European-wide regime that would co-exist alongside the national regimes (thus 
becoming a 28
th regime) would in the long run be an easier way to integrate markets. An example of an 
optional regime in financial regulation is the UCITS directive, which has proven to be very successful, 
although a more recent example in another field, the European Company Statute, which offers an optional 
way to incorporate a business, has so far proven unsuccessful (see Arbak, 2008). The problem is that an 
optional regime needs to be fully adopted and promoted by all the member states, if not, it will not take 
off. The reference to national law should also be limited, as it reduces the attractiveness of the regime. 
Specifically in the area of retail financial markets, given the difficulty encountered so far in finding 
agreement on basic consumer protection measures amongst EU member states, it could prove to be an 
almost impossible exercise. 
3.  Does the levelling-up process in harmonisation reduce market contestability, and thus competition? 
The tendency towards more detailed harmonisation, as embodied in several more recent pieces of 
financial market legislation, and most pronounced in the MiFID directive, are proportionally more 














consolidation and increased scale in the sector.
6 This could further reduce competition, above all in retail 
financial markets, which already face an excessive degree of market concentration at local level. 
This reveals an inherent contradiction within the single market programme, at least as far as retail 
financial markets is concerned. The EU’s work stimulated increased consolidation in the private sector, 
and in the financial sector in particular, but this process has reduced competition in markets that are local 
in orientation.  
4.  From a competition policy perspective, there is not much the European Commission can do, apart 
from acting ex-post on clear and specific violations of antitrust rules. 
The high levels of concentration in certain member states are essentially an issue for the member state 
authorities to act upon, not the EU. If the EU wants a more integrated retail financial market, it would 
have to use other means than competition policy, such as a deliberate enterprise policy, or instigate class 
actions by user groups against banks. Policy initiatives in either field is seen to be unlikely. 
5.  There is a need to harmonise the objectives of supervision and to promote financial education. 
A buzzword in the post-FSAP context is supervisory convergence, by which is meant that supervisory 
instruments and procedures should be more closely aligned in the EU. However, this is putting the cart 
before the horse, in the sense that the EU should first formally harmonise the objectives of supervision. 
Although the broad objectives are the same – safeguarding the stability of the financial system and 
protecting consumers/investors – important differences may exist in other objectives. One of the 
objectives of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) is “the promotion of public understanding of the 
financial system”, which means that it needs to help consumers understand the financial products they 
buy. To our knowledge, this is not necessarily an objective of other supervisory authorities in the EU. 
Acceptance of this objective would come to meet a growing need for financial literacy in a world with 
increasingly complex financial products, and at the same time clarify that the consumer is in first instance 
liable for her/his financial decisions. 
Harmonising the objectives of supervision, and promoting financial education could also clarify the role 
of the EU in this domain, on which the European Commission has recently launched some initiatives.  
6.  What is the impact of the 2007-08 financial market turmoil? 
The financial market turmoil has highlighted the need to urgently address some important issues on the 
supervisory side that also affect consumers, most notably the 1994 deposit guarantee schemes directive. 
In the event of a European-wide bank failure, the realisation by European citizens that deposit guarantee 
levels differ substantially across the EU would rapidly backfire against the single financial market. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Notwithstanding over 15 years of the single market and almost 10 years of monetary union, retail 
financial markets in the EU remain diverse, and signs of more integration and increasing convergence are 
limited. Markets are national at best, and behave according to local patterns.  
Not much change can be expected in the coming years in the structure of retail financial markets. The 
main instrument left at EU level to create a more integrated retail financial market is competition policy, 
but the problem of high concentration is mainly at a national level, meaning that it is up to national 
                                                 














authorities to react, and EU action under antitrust policy is by nature ad-hoc and ex-post. Hence structural 
change can only be expected to happen slowly over time. 
The main issue is to make users aware of the increased possibilities offered by the single market, and of 
their rights under EU law. In this sense, the EU has missed a golden opportunity to advertise its retail 
financial market agenda more broadly among European citizens. The 1999 Financial Services Action 
Plan, which was essentially about wholesale financial markets, was widely advertised and publicised by 
the EU. This contributed to public awareness of the issues at stake, the support for the programme and its 
success. The retail agenda has been advertised much less or not at all. EU work on SEPA, UCITS and 
consumer credit are not known beyond a limited circle of specialists. 
The EU should also formally align the objectives of financial supervision and propose to make financial 
education a task for the authorities in all the member states. This would at the same time raise the 
awareness amongst consumers of the benefits of the single market. 
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